Exposing a definite or indefinite description by paraphrase
Sometimes a problematic definite or indefinite description can come in disguise, and when it does, it is harder to see any neon lights, because one does not actually see the word 'the' or 'a(n)'. Still, it may be lurking in the background, to be revealed in its neon glory by paraphrase.
Example. To maximize a quantity means to achieve THE greatest amount of some quantity. The paraphrase makes the definite description explicit. But we can also speak of a function that has multiple maxima, many points at which it achieves its maximum value. Think of y = cos x-while in a sense it has one maximum (namely, 1), in another sense it has many maxima (at x = ± 2nπ, n = 0, 1, 2, …). In the latter sense, each of these points is A maximum, the indefinite description made explicit. The same can be said for minimizing a quantity, and minima, mutatis mutandis. But whether we speak of the single maximal/minimal value attained by a quantity, or the many ways in which it may be attained, one cannot maximize/minimize a quantity that has no maximum/minimum.
For instance, according to decision theory, rationality requires you to maximize expected utility. It does not seem problematic for decision theory if there are multiple ways to do so in a given situation. Consider Buridan's Ass, who can maximize expected utility by eating either of two equidistant hay bails; either way, it will achieve THE maximum amount of expected utility. On the other hand, cases in which there is an infinite sequence of actions of ever-greater expected utility are problematic. Pollock's (1983) Ever-better wine provides an example: the longer you wait to open the bottle of wine, the better it gets. When should you open it? We can specify the case so that any time is too soon; yet never opening it is the worst option of all. There is no sense in which you can maximize expected utility here.
Similarly, a naïve version of consequentialism says that one is morally required to perform an action that has maximally good consequences (in some sense or other); but one cannot if there are actions that yield better and better consequences without end. Moving to a higher level of abstraction, some functions have no maximum at all-those that increase towards an asymptote without ever reaching it, or that have no bound, or whose range is an open set.
Indeterminacy
So far, we have looked at cases where 'the F' does not have a unique referent, because there is determinately more than one F, or determinately none; and cases where 'a(n) F' does not have a referent, because there are determinately none. A different kind of problem arises when it is indeterminate how many F's there are, and in particular, it is indeterminate whether there is one, or indeterminate whether there is at least one. Similarly, the word 'the' suggests that there is a determinate answer to a relevant question, or a fact of the matter of the bearer of some relevant property. But there might be indeterminacy regarding these things.
Example. Philosophers of biology ask questions such as 'What is the function of the frog's eye?' And various answers seem reasonable: 'to detect flies', 'to detect dark spots', 'to detect food', and so on. But perhaps there is no determinate answer to the question-no determinate function of the frog's eye. Perhaps it is even indeterminate whether it has any function at all.
Example. What is the right thing to do when one faces a moral dilemma? Parfit (1984) argues that often it is indeterminate. It may even be indeterminate whether there is a right thing to do. drinking age? Some settings would be far too high or far too low, but still there is a range of reasonable settings, and choosing one from the range is arbitrary. A sign of the arbitrariness is that different societies choose differently, and sometimes a given society will revise its settings over time. But we are typically not troubled by their arbitrariness, for it is not arbitrary that some setting be made, as opposed to none.
On the other hand, arbitrary choices are often regarded as fatal to philosophical positions that have to make them. The classical interpretation of probability, with its notorious principle of indifference, and Carnap's (1952) logical interpretation of probability, have been widely thought to be killed, or at least seriously wounded, by the apparently arbitrary choices that they force upon us-the suitable partition of 'equipossible' events in the former case, or the setting of an index of inductive caution, λ, in the latter.
More broadly, arbitrariness can be a sign of a flaw in a philosophical position. It is forced to make a choice; but why that choice, when it apparently could just as A good case study, which will showcase several techniques, involves Lewis's (1973a Lewis's ( , 1994 analysis of laws of nature. Start with all of the true theories of the world. Some are very simple, but not informative-e.g. the theory whose sole axiom is that everything is self-identical. Some are very informative, but not simple-e.g. the collective (true) contents of Wikipedia. Some achieve a better balance of simplicity and informativeness than others. According to Lewis, the laws of nature are the theorems of the true theory of the world that best balances simplicity and informativeness-for short, the best system. But he acknowledges the possibility that there may be more than one reasonable way to trade off simplicity against informativeness. Different standards for balancing simplicity and informativeness may yield different theories as the winner of the Lewisian competition. What, then, are the laws? We could simply choose one set of standards, and insist that it dictates what the laws are. But why that set, rather than another set? This choice threatens to be arbitrary.
More generally, a problem arises for a philosophical position when there are multiple candidates for some job description appealed to by that position, all apparently equally good, and choosing any one of them over the others seems arbitrary.
But there are various possible responses. I will classify them into three kinds:
1) Symmetry-breaking responses (playing favourites): all candidates are equal, but some are more equal than others.
2) Symmetry-preserving responses (even-handed): all candidates really are equal, but we can deal with that.
3) Hybrid responses: first some symmetry-breaking; then, symmetry-preserving among the candidates that remain.
1) Symmetry-breaking responses 1)i. One of the candidates is salient, or privileged
The first response is to insist that one of the candidates stands out after all, so choosing it over the others is not arbitrary after all. I do not have an account of what makes a candidate salient or privileged, but I do have some rules of thumb. In daily life, when numbers are involved, natural numbers are usually salient. For example, no society imposes a drinking age of 18½ years old. Some natural numbers are especially salient-for example, 1 and multiples of powers of 10 often stand out from their neighbors. I bet you have never seen a speed limit of 103 km/h! In daily life and in philosophy, extremal cases are usually salient. So too are points of symmetry, and they can provide symmetry-breakers! In doing so, they can answer charges of arbitrariness. One candidate stands out: the symmetrically placed one.
Consider our dividing a pie that you and I both want-if we don't agree on the 50/50 split, what could we agree on?
And in philosophy more specifically, one candidate for a job description may be privileged in virtue of being more fundamental than its rivals-for examples, its rivals are reducible to that candidate, or supervene on it, but not vice versa. Then it may be appropriate to thump the table in favour of that candidate. Or a candidate may be privileged, but not for any deep metaphysical reason. It may be so merely in virtue of contingent facts about our linguistic practices, for instance.
I take Lewis to have been sympathetic to a 'privileged candidate' response for his account of lawhood: that there are privileged standards for balancing simplicity and informativeness. We could begin to flesh out this idea-for example, by considering the lengths of descriptions of the world given by various competing axiomatized theories, couched in some canonical language in which all predicates correspond to natural properties. Some authors have similarly attempted to rehabilitate the principle of indifference by regarding certain partitions to be privileged-for instance, those that are maximally fine grained (Elga's 2004 "predicaments") 
1)ii. Go subjectivist/pragmatist
The next response runs: "You get to choose the candidate that you want-it's your interests that you want to serve!" This response may be plausible when the relevant job description involves subjects, for example rational agents. Subjective Bayesians about probability, for example, are often untroubled by the seeming arbitrariness in the choice of priors. The response might also allow or explain no-fault disagreements between different subjects. But it is surely implausible for the laws of nature.
1)iii. Go conventionalist
"We get to stipulate the winning candidate; having done so, we agree on it thereafter." (Note that arbitrariness of a choice was a key part of Lewis's (1969) definition of that choice being a matter of convention.) This response works for some of the laws of society, up to a point-e.g. the side of the road on which one drives, the setting of speed limits, the voting age, and drinking age. Again, this response is not so promising for the laws of nature-we don't get to decide what they are. Some philosophical problems should not be farmed out to sociologists.
1)iv. 'Nature is kind'
"The multiplicity problem is not really a problem, because however we reasonably make the arbitrary choice, there will be the same clear winner. While there might in principle be disagreement among the multiple best candidates for some job description, in fact such disagreement will not arise. Think of this as an empirical bet that nature is kind to us, and will see to it that all these candidates agree." Lewis favoured this response regarding the laws of nature. He hoped that one theory would win the Lewisian competition so decisively that it would not matter exactly how simplicity and strength were traded off, within reasonable limits. This response is perhaps not so effective for an analysis of lawhood that is intended to hold in other possible worlds, including those in which nature is unkind; but perhaps our concept of lawhood would not apply in such a world.
2) Symmetry-preserving responses 2)i. Pluralism "All of the candidates are right. Each provides a legitimate meaning, a reasonable explication of an inexact concept or a reasonable precisification of a vague concept."
This may be a good response when the arbitrariness at issue is purely semantic.
At the other end of the spectrum, we have 2)ii. Eliminativism "None of the candidates are right. The multiplicity of candidates serves to show that the original concept is incoherent, and should be eliminated." This may be a good way to bring out problems with a concept that was already in dispute, as 'law of nature' is to some extent. But there is a danger of this response 'proving too much'.
Most of our concepts are vague, and susceptible to sorites reasoning. We may be left with very few of them if we wield this response too enthusiastically. To be sure, however, even ordinary objects are under threat from such reasoning by eliminativists such as Unger (1979) and van Inwagen (1990) .
Somewhere between the extremes of this response and the previous one, we have 2)iii. It's a terminological matter "It's not that any given candidate is right or wrong. Proponents of different candidates are merely taking different stands on a terminological issue." Again, this may be a good response when the arbitrariness at issue is purely semantic. But of course the setting of the side of the road one drives on, speed limits, the drinking age, or voting age is not a terminological matter.
2)iv. It's indeterminate
"There is no fact of the matter of what the right candidate is. Rather, it is indeterminate." This could be a good explanation of why the leading candidates are tied; or their being tied could explain why the matter is indeterminate.
2)v. Supervaluate "What's true on all ways of making the arbitrary choice is determinately true. What's false on all ways is determinately false. Everything else is indeterminate." According to Lewis (1973a) , the laws are those theorems common to all of the candidates for the best theories. On this approach, as he later (1994) concedes, there is the threat that there will be little or no overlap between the best theories, in which case there will be few laws or none. We might hope that nature is at least a bit kind, guaranteeing a decent amount of overlap.
Recall the problem for Stalnaker's account of counterfactuals that there may be ties for which antecedent-world is nearest. He later (1981) responds by supervaluating over the candidates.
2)vi. Subvaluate "What's true/false on all ways of making the arbitrary choice is determinately true/false. Everything else is true and false." On this approach, there is the threat that there will be too many laws. And some of them may be highly disjunctive, piecing together regularities favoured by one best system with those favoured by another, and yielding something that is not simple by any standard.
Here, and in following pluralism by eliminativism above, we encounter another mini-heuristic: do the opposite. Take some approach to a problem, and follow the 
3) Hybrid responses
These responses combine some symmetry-breaking response (to cull some of the candidates while leaving others live) with some symmetry-preserving response (to treat those that remain even-handedly). One might insist, for instance, that some (but not all) of the candidates are privileged; then supervaluate over those that remain. Or one might consider all of the candidates that are subjectively chosen by some agent or other, and subvaluate over those. And so on. This yields many hybrid responses, mixing and matching techniques from the previous two categories.
I have presented many ways of responding to arbitrariness. Which should be used in a given case? Is that arbitrary?! How should we respond?! Different ways are appropriate for different cases, and I don't have a heuristic for deciding that (yet). I suggest that where possible, one should look to the symmetry-breaking strategies first, and only when they fail to leave just one candidate standing, look to the symmetry-preserving strategies over those that remain. But this still leaves open many possible responses, which will need to be handled on a case-by-case basis. Fear not-I have no aspirations to turn students into philosophical automata. There will always be an important place for good philosophical judgment.
So much for arbitrariness. It is continuous with the next set of closely related heuristics, which I will put under one big heading.
Continuity

Continuity reasoning
Let's revisit the sorites paradox from a different perspective. You can draw a line in the sand, so to speak, and claim that there is a particular grain at which a heap suddenly comes into being-say, the 17 th . But it seems absurd that such a small change in one respect, the difference between 16 and 17 grains, should result in such a large difference in another respect, the non-existence or existence of a heap. Note that the problem here is not that of arbitrariness, justifying why the line should be drawn there rather than elsewhere. Rather, the problem is that there shouldn't be a line at all. This is an example of continuity reasoning. Roughly, the pattern is that one variable is a function of another, and small changes in the former should lead to small changes in the latter. Such reasoning is often part of commonsense. We are surprised, for instance, when we are told that we share 98.4% of our DNA with chimpanzees. How can such a small change in genotype lead to such a large change in phenotype? More generally, discontinuities may induce some of the discomfort that arbitrariness may cause us. Why should cases that are similar in some relevant respect give rise to such dissimilarity in another respect? And where there is a discontinuous 'jump' in some function of interest or importance to us, both the placement and the size of the jump may seem disconcertingly arbitrary.
It should be stressed how much continuity reasoning underwrites inductive inference. We don't just think that the unobserved resembles the observed (in suitable respects); we also think that the nearby unobserved closely resembles the observed, and typically the more nearby, the closer the resemblance (other things being equal). The world mostly does not deliver abrupt changes; properties tend to change gradually over space and time. Consider how painting restoration, or computer programs for reducing noise on photographs, operate on this assumption:
where there is information on only particular parts of a picture, the default assumption is that nearby parts will be the same, or similar. Induction would be stymied if things systematically underwent sudden jolts. And when it is, that just adds to our discomfort! Continuity reasoning is also common and fertile in philosophy. Sider (2002) poses the problem that certain conceptions of Hell are incompatible with a traditional doctrine about God. According to these conceptions, after we die, we either go to Heaven or Hell; some of us go to Heaven and some go to Hell; Heaven is much better than Hell; and God decides who goes where. The concern is that any plausible criterion for his decision will admit of borderline cases. As a result, there will be some people who just make the cut and go to Heaven, and other very similar people who just miss out. Now Sider appeals to a continuity premise: "the proportionality of justice prohibits very unequal treatment of persons who are very similar in relevant respects" (59). He argues that one cannot square such treatment with God being just.
One may argue in a similar way for vegetarianism being morally required.
Clearly we should not be omnivores-e.g. cannibalism is surely morally prohibited, and for that matter so is eating chimpanzees, most of us would agree. 5 If we are meat-eaters at all, we must have some criterion for deciding which animals it is permissible to eat and which not-as it might be, intelligence or sentience. Again this criterion will admit of borderline cases. Some animals will just make the cut (as it were) for being off limits for eating, and others will just miss out. And now comes the continuity premise: animals that are so similar to each other in relevant respects
should not be given such disparate treatment. Conclusion: all animals are off limits.
We could argue along similar lines against the death penalty. Whatever criterion we use for drawing a line on the basis of severity of crime, beyond which perpetrators are executed, their punishment would be strikingly different from that of similar offenders just short of the line. Indeed, there is a whole class of "slippery" slope arguments that have been deployed against euthanasia, abortion, gun control, and so on, which in each case appeal to a continuity intuition that similar cases should be treated similarly.
Of course, there are ways of fighting back. For starters, continuity reasoning can be run in both directions. We can equally 'show' that any collection of grains of sand, however small, is a heap by starting with a paradigm case of a heap, removing grains of sand one by one, and insisting that no single removal could turn a heap into a non-heap. The very same continuity premise that underwrites an argument for vegetarianism could just as well underwrite an argument for omnivorism. And eventually some crackpot is bound to appeal to continuity reasoning to argue for the far more widespread use of the death penalty, perhaps even supplanting fines for driving on the wrong side of the road. Beware of the slippery slope that the unbridled use of continuity reasoning could send us down! We can drive continuity reasoning in two directions-as we might say, left-to-right (à) and right-to-left (ß). There is again the threat of arbitrariness: why should one direction be favoured over the
other? Yet if we drive the reasoning in both directions, we will arrive at a contradiction (àß).
Moreover, continuity-based arguments must appeal to some sort of metric, at least loosely specified-some measure of 'distance' according to which we can judge roughly how close entities or cases are to each other. (It need not be numerical, but it must be more than merely a comparative ordering.) Disputes might arise over the choice of metric, and favouring one metric over another might appear to be arbitrary.
And whatever the metric, sometimes discontinuities are acceptable, and even required. My favourite function is the Alan Hájek function. It is the function from people to {0, 1} that is my characteristic function: it assigns 1 to me, and 0 to everyone else. Offhand, this function should be discontinuous, whatever metric we impose to capture how similar people are to one another. It doesn't matter how close you are to me according to such a metric; you still get a 0, and only I get a 1!
Drawing inspiration from the mathematics of continuous functions
Let's look to mathematics for a better understanding of continuity, through its treatment of continuous functions. The informal definition of such a function is that small changes in its input value result in correspondingly small changes in its output value. More formally, the function f(x) is continuous at c if
This presupposes an underlying metric, as becomes clear when the limit is given its usual 'ε … δ' definition.
We may generalize this for a function between two topological spaces: a function Arntzenius and Maudlin (2010) ingeniously invoke this theorem to resolve a paradox concerning time travel. An old-fashioned camera takes a picture of a developed black-and-white film-a 'negative'-that leaves a time machine. The picture is developed, and the negative put in the time machine, sent back to the time at which the picture is to be taken, and leaves the time machine then. The trouble is that a negative has the complementary shades to the object of which it is a picture-a dark grey object has a light grey negative, and so on-so the story appears to be 
Discontinuity at infinity
This is an instance of another philosophically important phenomenon, which we might call discontinuity at infinity. This is not the place to characterize this technical notion rigourously, but roughly it involves the failure of a natural extension to the definition of continuity to cases where we can make sense of a function's behaviour at infinity:
where <x n > is an increasing sequence. It could be a sequence of ordered functions, with f representing a binary property that another function could have or not. For example, everywhere-differentiability of a function could be represented by a 1, its failure represented by a 0; the Weierstrass function scores a 0, even though it is the limit of a sequence of functions each of which scores a 1.
Again, we recognize discontinuity at infinity in various philosophical examples. It figures in certain paradoxical decision problems that involve infinity in some way.
Nover and Hájek's (2004) Pasadena game has a pathological (indeed, undefined) expected utility that is the limit of a sequence of perfectly well-behaved expected utilities. Arntzenius, Elga and Hawthorne's (2004) 'Satan's Apple' involves an infinite sequential choice problem that becomes paradoxical only when the limit at infinity is reached. And Pollock's problem of when to open the Ever-better wine displays a similar discontinuity at infinity: the option of waiting forever and never opening the wine is discontinuously worse than all of the options that approach it.
Bartha, Barker and Hájek (MS) characterize in more detail decision problems that are discontinuous at infinity, and discuss some methods for approaching them.
While I applaud using mathematical theorems to support philosophical points (and I have just done so myself), we should keep in mind Benacerraf's (1967) • Putnam (1980): the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem shows that realism is false.
• Lucas (1961) and Penrose (1989): Gödel's theorem shows that minds are not machines.
• Various people: the Dutch book theorem shows that credences are rationally required to be probabilities.
None of these theorems establish what they are purported to without the aid of ancillary philosophical premises. Spelling them out clarifies what the associated arguments really should be, and in doing so fixes targets for further debate. I, for example, assumed that a particle could in principle move according to a Weierstrass function.
Continuity reasoning in philosophical methodology
But let's continue with continuity reasoning, this time applied at a 'meta'-level.
Continuity considerations can be applied to philosophical methodology itself. More generally, I think that the symmetry requirement is kindred with continuity reasoning. Both are useful heuristics. Jaynes (2003), for instance, appeals to the symmetry requirement in his defence of the principle of indifference, applying the principle to transformations of a probability problem that leave it essentially unchanged.
Continuity and modal induction
Earlier I emphasised the important role that continuity reasoning can play in induction, ampliatively inferring a conclusion about the actual world from a premise about this world. Continuity reasoning can also play an important role in what we might call modal induction: ampliatively inferring a conclusion about the space of possible worlds from a premise about this space.
In my (forthcoming) I offer various methods for showing that something, call it X, is possible. One such method can be regarded as employing continuity reasoning. It follows this schema:
1) Almost-X is possible.
2) The small difference between almost-X and X makes no difference to possibility.
Conclusion: X is possible. Chalmers (1996) argues along these lines that physical-duplicate zombies are possible (beings that have no conscious experiences, but that are physically identical to normal agents that have conscious experiences). Functional-duplicate zombies (functionally identical to normal agents), he argues firstly, are possible; and moving from functional-duplicates to physical-duplicates will not make a difference to what's possible.
Mismatch of degrees
It's a problem for a putative analysis of some concept, C, if C comes in degrees that vary continuously, while the analysans has discontinuous 'jumps', or vice versa.
More generally, it's a problem if there is a mismatch of the degrees of the analysandum and the analysans. A notable case of this is when one side of a putative analysis comes in degrees, while the other does not. This in turn may involve a mismatch of vagueness, one side admitting borderline cases, the other not.
The analysandum does not come in degrees, analysans does
Berkeley was fond of saying that to exist is to be perceived. (For some reason, he was particularly fond of saying it in Latin.) Now, existence does not come in degrees-it is the ultimate on/off property or attribute. But offhand, being perceived does. Think of perceiving a table in a totally dark room, in which you slowly turn the lights up using a 'dimmer' dial, or think of things on the periphery of your visual field. Moreover, these provide borderline cases of being perceived; but it is hard to make sense of borderline cases of existence.
To be sure, we might reply on behalf of Berkeley that 'being perceived' is a threshold notion-e.g. perceiving the table suddenly begins at a certain minimal light level. But that introduces a disquieting discontinuity, and an apparent arbitrariness in the setting of the threshold. Then again, we might use one of the many responses to arbitrariness that I detailed in section 2, so I do not claim this objection is decisive.
Berkeley himself replied that everything that exists is perceived by God; and presumably he would add that God's perceptions don't come in degrees.
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Surely this resulting sequence is partially random. But without paying any attention to the details of the von Mises/Church analysis, you know that it cannot deliver that verdict. (In fact, its verdict is that the sequence is non-random-entirely so!)
This account of randomness was intended to undergird von Mises' frequentist account of (objective) probabilities: they are relative frequencies in random sequences of trials. Philosophers now mostly agree that frequentism provides a bad analysis of probability (see my 1996 and 2008 for many arguments for this conclusion). But a bad analysis can provide a good heuristic. It will typically not be a total failure-it will typically get a wide range of central cases right. (If it did not, it presumably would never see the light of day.) While failing to give necessary and sufficient conditions for its analysandum, it may nevertheless be a usually-reliable guide to the analysandum, reliable enough to serve as a useful way to think about the associated concept.
This brings us to the next heuristic-or better, set of heuristics.
Replace non-extensional notions with extensional surrogates 8
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) have famously contended that we are bad at reasoning probabilistically-witness our tendency to neglect base rates or to commit the conjunction fallacy on various probability questions. For example, people are prone to think that if they test positive for a disease when given a test that is 95%
reliable-it has a 5% chance of giving false positives and a 5% chance of giving false negatives-the chance that they have the disease is 95%. This neglects the prior probability ('base rate') that they have the disease in the first place, which may render that chance much smaller (or indeed, higher). The importance of this prior probability is obvious when we consider an extreme case, in which a given person has no chance of having the disease; then, a positive test result is guaranteed to be a Gigerenzer (1991) has found that if probability problems are rephrased in terms of frequencies, we fare much better. This is not to say that probabilities are frequencies (they are not); just that frequentist thinking is a good heuristic for probabilistic thinking. So, translate a probability problem into a parallel frequency problem, or if you like, pretend that probabilities are frequencies. Imagine, say, that you are one of 10,000 people who have taken the test, and that it showed positive. Now suppose you learn that the base rate of the disease is 1%, so only 100 people in the population have the disease, and 9900 don't (according to the pretence). 95 of the former group (truly) showed positive, and 495 of the latter group (falsely) showed positive. That is, less than 1/5 of the people in your shoes actually have the disease. That should be comforting. Frequentist thinking makes the point intuitive and vivid.
Inspired by this, I propose a related heuristic: replace intensional notions with extensional surrogates. An intensional notion is one for which truth value may fail to be preserved under replacement of co-referential expressions; an extensional notion is one for which truth value is preserved. 9 I submit that extensional notions are easier to think about and to deal with; intensional notions are more opaque to us. The typical cases that I will consider are ones in which we begin with a modal notion, and replace it with some quantificational notion. But the heuristic covers other cases as well.
In offering this heuristic I am not suggesting that a given extensional replaceans needs to provide an analysis or reduction of the original intensional replaceandum.
The heuristic is entirely analytically and metaphysically innocent. I am suggesting only that there is heuristic value in reasoning with the extensional surrogate; it is a proposal for guiding the mind. To be sure, one hopes that the surrogate resembles the original closely enough that the mind does not go badly wrong when so guided, at least in typical or important cases. If the surrogate does provide a genuine analysis or reduction (in which case calling it a "surrogate" undersells it), so much the better.
Some examples are well entrenched in philosophical thinking:
• • Replace indicative conditionals with material conditionals. (Material conditionals are extensional since they are truth functional, and the extension of a sentence is its truth value.)
Or perhaps better is a two-step replacement:
• Replace indicative conditionals with strict conditionals, and replace them with material conditionals true in all possible worlds.
The first step replaces an intensional notion with another intensional notion, but one that has a simple extensional translation.
Then there are analyses whose failure is relatively uncontroversial nowadays, yet still they may be useful ways to think about the relevant concepts, if only as an act of pretence:
• Replace talk of laws of nature with talk of universal generalizations over individual entities.
• Replace talk of causation with talk of constant conjunction of event-types.
Indeed, a large part of the failure in each case stems from the extensional analysans not capturing the intensionality of the analysandum! 10 I have so far discussed the handling of intensional notions. But even more recalcitrant to our natural modes of thinking are hyperintensional notions-ones for which truth value may fail to be preserved even under replacement of necessarily coreferential expressions. Properties, at least when finely individuated, are often taken to be examples-think of triangular and trilateral as distinct properties, yet necessarily co-present or co-absent. Still, there is an extensional surrogate:
• Replace talk of properties with talk of sets of possible individuals.
Hyperintensional notions count as intensional according to the definition that I gave;
but it is common to give special status to them, distinguishing them from what we might call the merely intensional. To avoid any terminological confusion, we might do better to restate our heuristic: replace non-extensional notions with extensional surrogates. This covers both ways for a notion to fail to be extensional: (merely) intensional, and hyperintensional. Set-theoretic treatments of concepts are extensional, and they often provide helpful replacements of both kinds of concepts.
And so it goes. We might come up with our own ways of unpacking a nonextensional concept in an extensional way. I like this one:
• Replace talk of norms with universal quantification over all norm-abiding agents. For example, replace 'one has a moral obligation to treat others as 10 A reason why these extensional analyses clearly fail, where some considered earlier appear to succeed, may be that these quantify over extensional entities, whereas the successful ones quantified over entities that themselves might be regarded as intensional (possible worlds, a modal notion). It is less clear that the analysis of (in)determinacy is successful; but then, perhaps it is less clear whether the notion of a precisification being admissible is itself intensional. (If it is tacitly modal, then presumably it is.) To the extent that an analysis traffics in entities that are themselves intensional, perhaps it is not truly an extensional analysis after all. I bracket that concern here, trusting that applications of my heuristic are easy to recognize in any case.
ends rather than means' with 'all morality-abiding agents are agents who treat others as ends rather than means'.
Replace non-extensional notions with extensional surrogates is a special case of a more general heuristic: replace hard notions with easier surrogates. That's rather vague, but the idea is to replace concepts that confound us with close relatives that we understand better, that come more naturally to us-for example, that are expressible using first-order logic and set theory. We must be careful that there is not too much distance between the original concepts and their surrogates, for if there is, we run the risk that the surrogates will misguide us. In an especially happy replacement, the replaceans has the same logic as the replaceandum, sanctioning exactly the same inferences. This is clearly the case when replacing probabilities with frequencies-the latter obey the probability axioms (with finite additivity). It is arguably also the case with the extensional replacements of necessity and possibility (with suitable choices of accessibility relations), and of counterfactuals. But even when it is clearly not the case, the replaceans can serve as a guide to reasoningdefeasible, to be sure. Mill's methods for identifying causation are really methods for identifying constant conjunction; and while causal inference has come a long way since Mill, they still provide good rules of thumb. We should just remember that good rules of thumb are not the last word.
Replace non-extensional notions with extensional surrogates is a powerful heuristic, I think, because it is easier to picture things when they're extensional. This brings me to my final heuristic. 
Draw a picture
It may not be immediately obvious that this is not a valid argument form. But he goes on to draw diagrams that allow one to see easily that it is not.
However, the draw a picture heuristic can stand alone, unaided by the previous heuristic. For example, it helps to diagram causal relationships even without entertaining the fiction that causation is merely constant conjunction-either with Lewis-style (1973b) 'neuron diagrams', or Pearl-style (2009) causal networks.
Physicists know well the power of pictures-for example, drawing a Minkowski space-time diagram rather than performing a deduction using the mathematics of special relativity. When a rod with clocks at each end moves relative to you, the clock at the front runs behind the clock at the back. Showing this is relatively easy with a diagram, relatively hard with the mathematics. Mathematicians are similarly well versed in the heuristic utility of pictorial representations of abstract relationships.
Indeed, Nelson (1993) is an entire book of proofs without words or symbols. Again, we philosophers can import some of our heuristics from other disciplines.
Some metaphilosophical ruminations
It is another psychological fact about us that we are limited in our ability to see
what follows from what. (The Wason selection task famously brings this out.) We are prone to drawing illicit inferences from our premises, and we are often blind to their consequences, which are sometimes unwelcome. Here, logic is our great tool, our consistency and validity policeman. But I must emphasise again that it is by no means our only such tool.
I can characterize a good chunk of the philosophy that I find congenial with the slogan 'making our implicit commitments explicit'. We collect, deploy and systematize intuitions, analyze arguments, conduct thought experiments, refine definitions, adduce normative constraints, and so on; and when we are doing our job properly, we check for the consistency and for any unwelcome consequences of our products (and celebrate the welcome ones). The heuristics are to a large extent aids to these enterprises.
Of course, you don't need to be a philosopher to make our implicit commitments some. We want heuristics that have some generality, but that also have real bite. Too general, and they become useless: e.g., "make an insightful point!" Too specific, and they become next to useless again: e.g., "when someone argues that space is purely 11 Now that you have reached the conclusion of this long paper, perhaps this is one of them.
As well as studying the content of our best scientific theories, we study the methodology of the best scientists. (See, for instance, Harper's recent (2012) book on Newton's methodology.) Doing so not only tells us something about how science gets done; it can also inspire us as to how to do it well. Similarly, studying the methodology of the best philosophers not only tells us something about how philosophy gets done; it can also inspire us as to how to do it well. I have learned from them many of the philosophical heuristics on my ever-growing list.
To the extent that we fail to pay attention to such heuristics, we miss out on rich resources for philosophical thinking. Yet I think that by and large, philosophers have been singularly unreflective about them. I invite you to reflect on them with me.
